How to stop a currency war
Keep calm, don’t expect quick fixes and above all don’t unleash a trade fight with China
如何遏制一场货币战争
-----保持镇定，不要期望迅速的解决之道，尤其不要与中国发动贸易战
Oct 14th 2010
《经济学人》2010-10-14
IN RECENT weeks the world economy has been on a war footing, at least rhetorically. Ever since Brazil’s finance minister, Guido Mantega, declared on September 27th that an “international currency war” had broken out, the global economic debate has been recast in battlefield terms, not just by excitable headline-writers, but by officials themselves. Gone is the fuzzy rhetoric about co-operation to boost global growth. A more combative tone has taken hold (see article). Countries blame each other for distorting global demand, with weapons that range from quantitative easing (printing money to buy bonds) to currency intervention and capital controls.
夸张点说，最近几周整个世界的经济一直处于战争状态。自从巴西的财政部长Guido Mantega在9月27号发表言论称，“一场全球范围的货币战争已经打响”以来，随后就引发了火药味十足的全球性经济讨论，这些争论中的“参战人员”不仅有以此为生的专栏作者们，同样也吸引了大量的官员参与其中。以往那些含糊其辞的“通过合作来促进全球性经济增长”的观点已经一去不返了，取而代之的是一种更加激进强硬的论调。国家之间互相指责对方通过各种手段扭曲了全球的需求关系，这些手段包括量化宽松货币政策，干涉本币汇率及对货币资本的控制。
Behind all the smoke and fury, there are in fact three battles. The biggest one is over China’s unwillingness to allow the yuan to rise more quickly. American and European officials have sounded tougher about the “damaging dynamic” caused by China’s undervalued currency. Last month the House of Representatives passed a law allowing firms to seek tariff protection against countries with undervalued currencies, with a huge bipartisan majority. China’s “unfair” trade practices have become a hot topic in the mid-term elections.
在弥漫的硝烟背后，世界上目前实际上存在着三场战争。其中最大的一场战争是围绕着中国不愿意让人民币迅速地升值展开的。美国和欧盟的官员们已经强硬地指责人民币低估的汇率导致了“破坏性的灾难后果”。上个月，美国众议院以压倒性多数通过了一项法案，此法案旨在对低估本币汇率的国家征收特别关税。在美国中期选举来临之际，中国的“不公平”贸易活动已经成为了一个热门话题。
A second flashpoint is the rich world’s monetary policy, particularly the prospect that central banks may soon restart printing money to buy government bonds. The dollar has fallen as financial markets expect the Federal Reserve to act fastest and most boldly. The euro has soared as officials at the European Central Bank show least enthusiasm for such a shift. In China’s eyes (and, sotto voce, those of many other emerging-market governments), quantitative easing creates a gross distortion in the world economy as investors rush elsewhere, especially into emerging economies, in search of higher yields.
第二个争议点是发达国家的货币政策，尤其是央行可能会很快开始印发纸币来购买政府债券这一预期行为。正如金融市场对美联储迅速有力展开行动的预期一致，美元一直以来都在贬值。与此相反地是，欧元的不断升值则让欧洲央行的官员们高兴不起来。从中国的角度来看（或者可以说其他的发展中国家），随着量化宽松的货币政策的施行，投资者为了追寻更高的回报，转而进入其他地区进行投资，尤其是发展中国家，这使得全球经济产生了全局性的扭曲。
A third area of contention comes from how the developing countries respond to these capital flows. Rather than let their exchange rates soar, many governments have intervened to buy foreign currency, or imposed taxes on foreign capital inflows. Brazil recently doubled a tax on foreign purchases of its domestic debt. This week Thailand announced a new 15% withholding tax for foreign investors in its bonds.
第三个争议点是发展中国家如何应对大量涌入的资金流。为了避免让本国货币的汇率升值，许多政府都选择通过购买外国货币或对国外的资金流征税等方法来进行干涉。巴西最近施行了一项新政策，对国外投资者购买其国内债务征收双倍税收。本周泰国宣布对外国投资者购买泰国债券所获收益征收15%的预扣税。
Jaw-jaw, please
请喋喋不休的讨论吧
For now, these skirmishes fall far short of a real currency war. Many of the “weapons” look less menacing on closer inspection. The capital-inflow controls are modest. In the rich world only Japan has recently resorted to currency intervention, and so far only once. Nor is there much risk of an imminent descent into trade retaliation. Even in America, tariffs against China are still, with luck, a long way off—both because the currency bill is milder than it sounds and because it has yet to be passed by the Senate or signed by Barack Obama.
就目前来看，这些小争论还远远不够格称之为”一场真正的货币战争“。对这些”武器手段“深入研究后可以发现许多手段都缺乏威胁性。资本流的控制政策还算是比较温和。在发达国家中也只有日本最近采取了干涉本币汇率的措施，但也仅仅只使用了一次。目前也没有因为采取货币控制措施导致贸易报复的危险。即使在美国，对中国征收的关税政策还远没有达成一致意见（万幸！）---这一方面是因为汇率议案实际上比其听起来要温和的多，另一方面它还需要经参议院通过或被奥巴马总统签署生效。
Still, there is no room for complacency. Today’s phoney war could quickly turn into a real dogfight. The conditions driving the divergence of economic policies—in particular, sluggish growth in the rich world—are likely to last for years. As fiscal austerity kicks in, the appeal of using a cheaper currency as a source of demand will increase, and the pressure on politicians to treat China as a scapegoat will rise. And if the flood of foreign capital intensifies, developing countries may be forced to choose between losing competitiveness, truly draconian capital controls or allowing their economies to overheat.
然而我们没有时间对此沾沾自喜。目前的”伪战争”可以迅速转变为一场真正的混战。驱动经济政策出现分歧的情况看上去还将持续数年之久，尤其是发达国家低迷的经济状况。随着财政紧缩政策的实施，使用低价位货币来刺激需求的呼声将越来越高，而政客们面临的将中国作为替罪羊的压力也会越来越大。如果外国资本加剧涌入，发展中国家将面临两难选择，要么实施严厉的资本控制政策，付出丧失竞争力的代价，要么就任由国外资本横行无忌，将国内经济炒得“过热”。
What needs to happen is fairly clear. Global demand needs rebalancing, away from indebted rich economies and towards more spending in the emerging world. Structural reforms to boost spending in those surplus economies will help, but their real exchange rates also need to appreciate. And, yes, the Chinese yuan is too low (see article). That is hurting not just the West but also other emerging countries (especially those with floating exchange rates) and indeed China itself, which needs to get more of its growth from domestic consumption.
我们需要做些什么是显而易见的。应该重新平衡全球性需求，使得消费的主体从发达经济体转为发展中国家。在这些贸易顺差的国家中通过调整经济结构来促进消费是有用的，同时它们的实际汇率也是很有益处的。当然，人民币的估值太低了。这不仅损害了西方国家的利益，也使得其他发展中国家（尤其是那些采取浮动汇率机制的国家）和中国自身受到损失，因为中国的增长很大程度上依赖于其国内的消费。
It is also clear that this will not be a painless process. China is right to worry about instability if workers in exporting companies lose their jobs. And even reasonable choices—such as the rich world’s mix of fiscal austerity and loose monetary policy—will have an uncomfortable impact on small, open emerging economies, in the form of unwelcome capital inflows. This flood of capital will be less devastating to them than the harm they would suffer if the West descended into deflation and stagnation, but it can still cause problems.
毫无疑问，这将会是一个阵痛的过程。中国为其经济的稳定性担忧是有道理的，如果其国内出口企业大量的工人失业，则会成为国内的不稳定因素。即使像发达国家采取的包含财政紧缩和宽松货币政策的混合型措施也会对新兴经济体产生不利影响，一种典型的表现就是大量的资本涌入国内市场。假如西方国家陷入通货紧缩的泥潭，经济停滞不前，这种情况对于新兴经济体的损害比国外资本的大量流入要更为严重，但仍然不可小觑资本流入所带来的问题。
Collective Seoul-searching
首尔聚首，共商解决之道
All this cries out for a multilateral approach, in which institutions such as the IMF and the G20 forge consensus among the big economies. The hitch is that the multilateral route has, so far, achieved little. Hence the chorus calling for a different line of attack—one that focuses on getting tough with China, through either retaliatory capital controls (such as not allowing China to buy American Treasury bonds) or trade sanctions. And it is not just the usual protectionist suspects: even some free-traders reckon that economic violence is the only way to shock China out of its self-harming obstinacy (and to stop a more widespread protectionist reaction later).
所有这一切都呼吁人们开展多边合作来解决目前经济发展所面临的困境，这需要IMF和G20等机构促成经济大国之间达成共识。然而我们面临的绊脚石在于迄今为止多边合作的方法收效甚微。因此各个利益集团呼吁结成新的攻击阵线---将关注的重心放在对中国采取强硬措施上，这些措施包括报复性的资本控制（比如不允许中国购买美国国债）或对华进行贸易制裁。这已经不仅仅是贸易保护主义者的猜测：即使一些自由贸易的拥护者也认为强硬的经济手段是能使中国从自我伤害的固执中醒悟过来的唯一途径（进而可以阻止更广范围的保护主义扩散）。
This newspaper is not convinced. The threats look like either unworkable bluffs (how can China be stopped from buying Treasuries, the most widely traded asset in the world’s financial markets?) or dangerous provocations. Confronted with a trade ultimatum, the Beijing regime, puffed up in its G2 hubris, may well reckon it is cheaper politically to retaliate to the United States in kind. That is how trade wars start.
本刊对此不以为然。这些恐吓性的措施看起来不过是不切实际的“纸老虎”或危险的挑衅行为罢了，试想下如何阻止中国购买美国国债，要知道那可是世界金融市场上最普遍的交易资产。面对贸易的最后通牒，中国政府心高气傲，可能会认为在政治上报复美国更简单。这便是贸易战怎么发生的了。
Anyway, to focus on America and China is to misunderstand the nature of the problem. The currency wars are about more than one villain and one victim. Rather, redouble multilateral efforts behind the scenes, especially by bringing in the emerging countries hurt by China’s policy. Brazil and others have only just begun to speak out. South Korea is hosting the G20 next month. Use the Seoul summit as a prompt, not to create some new Plaza Accord (today’s tensions are too complex to settle in a grand peace treaty of the sort hammered out by just five countries in New York in 1985) but as a way to clarify the debate and keep up the pressure. It will get fewer headlines; but this is a war that is best averted, not fought.
不管怎么说，将注意力只放在中美两国身上会让我们对问题的本质产生误解。货币战争可不仅仅是一个恶棍和一个受害者的游戏。更确切地说，我们应当对游戏幕后的多边关系投入双倍的努力，尤其要将深受中国货币政策伤害的发展中国家纳入其中。巴西和其他国家已经开始大声疾呼了。南韩也将在下个月举办G20峰会。以首尔峰会为契机，目的不在于缔结新的广场协议（在今天的激烈的国际环境背景下，想通过像1985年纽约5个国家缔结的优雅平和的条约来解决复杂的经济问题是不现实地），而是要明确争论的方向，并继续施压。这样一来，关于货币战争的头条新闻就会减少；但若能止战，则幸甚。
