How to grow

如何增长

Without faster growth the rich world’s economies will be stuck. But what can be done to achieve it? Our economics team sets out the options

若没有更快的增长，发达国家的经济将会停滞不前。但是怎样才能实现更快速的增长呢？我们的经济学家团队给出了一些选项。

  

Oct 7th 2010

《经济学人》2010-10-07

 

    WHAT will tomorrow’s historians see as the defining economic trend of the early 21st century? There are plenty of potential candidates, from the remaking of finance in the wake of the crash of 2008 to the explosion of sovereign debt. But the list will almost certainly be topped by the dramatic shift in global economic heft.

    未来的历史学家将会给21世纪初叶的经济趋势下一个怎样的定义呢？可选的关键字有很多，比如“2008金融危机之后的金融重建”，“外债高举”。但这个候选列表的前列肯定有一项是全球经济格局的巨大转变。

    Ten years ago rich countries dominated the world economy, contributing around two-thirds of global GDP after allowing for differences in purchasing power. Since then that share has fallen to just over half. In another decade it could be down to 40%. The bulk of global output will be produced in the emerging world.

    10年前发达国家主宰着世界经济，考虑到购买力的差异性，它们贡献了全球GDP的2/3。自那以后这一比例已经降低到1/2。下一个10年后这一比例将降低到40%。大部分的全球产量将来自于发展中国家。

    The pace of the shift testifies to these countries’ success. Thanks to globalisation and good policies, virtually all developing countries are catching up with their richer peers. In 2002-08 more than 85% of developing economies grew faster than America’s, compared with less than a third between 1960 and 2000, and virtually none in the century before that.

    这种经济格局转变的速度证明了这些国家的成功。由于全球化和政策得当，实际上所有的发展中国家都在拼命追赶它们的发达国家对手。2002到2008年超过85%的发展中国家的增长速度超过了美国，与之相比，在1960年到2000年间，仅有不到1/3，事实上1个世纪以前根本没有哪个发展中国家能追得上美国的发展速度。

This “rise of the rest” is a remarkable achievement, bringing with it unprecedented improvements in living standards for the majority of people on the planet. But there is another, less happy, explanation for the rapid shift in the global centre of economic gravity: the lack of growth in the big rich economies of America, western Europe and Japan. That will be the focus of this special report.

其它国家的崛起可以称得上是一项非凡的成就，伴随它而来的是这个星球上大多数人的生活水平得以提高。但也有另一种听上去让人不怎么愉悦的说法来解释全球经济核心的迅速转移：美国，西欧和日本等发达国家的经济增长乏力。此话题将是这篇特别报道的核心。

The next few years could be defined as much by the stagnation of the West as by the emergence of the rest, for three main reasons. The first is the sheer scale of the recession of 2008-09 and the weakness of the subsequent recovery. For the advanced economies as a whole, the slump that followed the global financial crisis was by far the deepest since the 1930s. It has left an unprecedented degree of unemployed workers and underused factories in its wake. Although output stopped shrinking in most countries a year ago, the recovery is proving too weak to put that idle capacity back to work quickly (see chart 1). The OECD, the Paris-based organisation that tracks advanced economies, does not expect this “output gap” to close until 2015.

接下去数年可以概述为西方的经济增长停滞，而其他国家则蓬勃发展，出现这一局面有三个原因。首先是2008年到09年之间大规模的经济衰退以及接下去经济复苏的乏力。对于整个发达国家世界来说，全球金融危机后出现的经济衰退是自1930年经济大萧条以来最严重的。在随后的复苏时期，工人的失业率和工厂的闲置率达到了前所未有的程度。尽管大多数国家的生产产出在1年期就停止了下降，但复苏的速度还远未达到理想的产能产出。据位于巴黎OECD组织预测（它专门跟踪发达国家经济趋势），要到2015年“产能的鸿沟”才能得以填平。

The second reason to worry about stagnation has to do with slowing supply. The level of demand determines whether economies run above or below their “trend” rate of growth, but that trend rate itself depends on the supply of workers and their productivity. That productivity in turn depends on the rate of capital investment and the pace of innovation. Across the rich world the supply of workers is about to slow as the number of pensioners rises. In western Europe the change will be especially marked. Over the coming decade the region’s working-age population, which until now has been rising slowly, will shrink by some 0.3% a year. In Japan, where the pool of potential workers is already shrinking, the pace of decline will more than double, to around 0.7% a year. America’s demography is far more favourable, but the growth in its working-age population, at some 0.3% a year over the coming two decades, will be less than a third of the post-war average.

　　担心经济停滞的第二个原因是供应速度的减慢。需求的水平决定了经济是运行在“趋势”增长率之上还是之下，但“趋势”增长率本身是由劳动力数量及其生产力来决定的。生产力反过来又依赖于资本投资率和技术革新的速度。纵观整个发达世界，随着养老金上涨，劳动力数量呈现减少趋势。这一趋势在西欧地区尤其显著。这一地区的劳动人口目前还保持缓步上升的态势，但在接下去的数十年将会按每年0.3%的速度递减。日本的劳动人口已经开始减少，未来数十年这一减少趋势将会加倍，达到每年0.7%。美国的形势稍微要好一些，但接下午的20年里劳动人口增长率也只有0.3%，这还不到二战后平均增长率的1/3。
　　With millions of workers unemployed, an impending slowdown in the labour supply might not seem much of a problem. But these demographic shifts set the boundaries for rich countries’ medium-term future, including their ability to service their public debt. Unless more immigrants are allowed in, or a larger proportion of the working-age population joins the labour force, or people retire later, or their productivity accelerates, the ageing population will translate into permanently slower potential growth. 
　　随着数以百万计的工人失业，劳动力人口供应方面的急速下降看起来倒也不算什么大问题。但是这种人口转移的趋势却为发达国家中长期未来的发展定下了基调，这包括了它们用于公共债务服务的能力。除非允许引入更多的移民，或者延迟退休年龄，或者提高生产率，人口老龄化将导致经济进入永久性的缓慢增长。

Calculations by Dale Jorgenson of Harvard University and Khuong Vu of the National University of Singapore make the point starkly. They show that the average underlying annual growth rate of the G7 group of big rich economies between 1998 and 2008 was 2.1%. On current demographic trends, and assuming that productivity improves at the same rate as in the past ten years, that potential rate of growth will come down to 1.45% a year over the next ten years, its slowest pace since the second world war. 

哈佛大学的Dale Jorgenson和新加坡国立大学的Khuong Vu研究结果有力地支持了这一观点。他们的研究表明1998年到2008年间G7发达国家的平均年增长率是2.1%。按目前的人口发展趋势，并假设生产率继续保持过去10年间的增长速度，未来10年间每年的经济增长速度将降低到1.45%，这将是自二战以来的最小增长速度。

Faster productivity growth could help to mitigate the slowdown, but it does not seem to be forthcoming. Before the financial crisis hit, the trend in productivity growth was flat or slowing in many rich countries even as it soared in the emerging world. Growth in output per worker in America, which had risen sharply in the late 1990s thanks to increased output of information technology, and again in the early part of this decade as the gains from IT spread throughout the economy, began to flag after 2004. It revived during the recession as firms slashed their labour force, but that boost may not last. Japan’s productivity slumped after its bubble burst in the early 1990s. Western Europe’s, overall, has also weakened since the mid-1990s. 

生产率的快速增长可以减缓经济的衰退，但遗憾的是目前还看不到这一趋势的发生。在金融危机发生之前，很多发达国家的生产率增长趋势是持平或减退的，而在发展中国家则是高涨的。美国人均产出值的增长经历了几个阶段，在90年代后期由于信息技术的产出的增加，它出现了快速增长，在最近10年的前期，由于信息技术渗透到经济的各个领域，也出现了快速增长，但自从2004年以来，人均产出值开始出现下降。在衰退期间，各个企业大幅裁员，使得人均产出值有所恢复，但这种方式的增长是无法保持下去的。日本的生产率在90年代初经济泡沫破灭之后出现大幅下滑。总体来说，自从90年代中期以来，西欧的生产率增长也减弱了。

The third reason to fret about the rich world’s stagnation is that the hangover from the financial crisis and the feebleness of the recovery could themselves dent economies’ potential. Long periods of high unemployment tend to reduce rather than augment the pool of potential workers. The unemployed lose their skills, and disillusioned workers drop out of the workforce. The shrinking of banks’ balance-sheets that follows a financial bust makes credit more costly and harder to come by.

担心发达世界经济停滞的第三个原因时金融危机所产生的后遗症以及恢复的乏力本身就会削弱经济增长的潜力。长期的高失业率更有可能减小潜在劳动人口数而不是扩大它。失业人口失去他们的工作技能，而那些幻想破灭的工人们则彻底离开了工人队伍。金融危机后随之而来的是银行资产负债表的缩水，这使得维持信用变得代价更高，更为困难。

Optimists point to America’s experience over the past century as evidence that recessions, even severe ones, need not do lasting damage. After every downturn the economy eventually bounced back so that for the period as a whole America’s underlying growth rate per person remained remarkably stable (see chart 2). Despite a lack of demand, America’s underlying productivity grew faster in the 1930s than in any other decade of the 20th century. Today’s high unemployment may also be preparing the ground for more efficient processes. 

乐观者指出美国在过去的经验表明，即使是最严重的经济衰退，也不一定会产生持续性的伤害。在每一次的衰退时期，经济最终都会触底反弹，从而使得美国整个的人均产值依然保持令人瞩目的稳定。在20世纪30年代经济大萧条时期，尽管缺乏足够的需求，美国的生产率的增长却比20世纪其他任何时期要快。今天的高失业率也可能为更有效率的发展打下了基础。

Most economists, however, reckon that rich economies’ capacity has already sustained some damage, especially in countries where much of the growth came from bubble industries like construction, as in Spain, and finance, as in Britain. The OECD now reckons that the fallout from the financial crisis will, on average, knock some 3% off rich countries’ potential output. Most of that decline has already occurred. 

然而，大多数经济学家认为发达国家的生产力已经承受了不小的伤害，尤其是那些增长主要来自于泡沫产业的国家，比如建筑行业，代表有西班牙，比如金融行业，代表有英国。OECD组织认为由于金融危机的影响，发达国家的可能产出值将降低3%左右。这一减少的趋势在许多发达国家中已经出现了。

The longer that demand remains weak, the greater the damage is likely to be. Japan’s experience over the past two decades is a cautionary example, especially to fast-ageing European economies. The country’s financial crash in the early 1990s contributed to a slump in productivity growth. Soon afterwards the working-age population began to shrink. A series of policy mistakes caused the hangover from the financial crisis to linger. The economy failed to recover and deflation set in. The result was a persistent combination of weak demand and slowing supply. 

需求维持低水平的时间越长，其对经济造成的伤害就越大。过去20年间日本的发展经验是一个值得深思的例子，尤其是对于人口快速老龄化的欧洲国家来说。日本在90年代的金融泡沫破灭导致了生产力增长的大幅下降。然后很快劳动人口就开始衰减。一系列政策上的失误导致金融危机的后遗症持续伤害着日本的经济。于是经济的复苏失败了，通货紧缩随之开始。低水平的需求和衰减的供应的持续性结合导致了这一结果的发生。

To avoid Japan’s fate, rich countries need to foster growth in two ways, by supporting short-term demand and by boosting long-term supply. Unfortunately, today’s policymakers often see these two strategies as alternatives rather than complements. Many of the Keynesian economists who fret about the lack of private demand think that concerns about economies’ medium-term potential are beside the point at the moment. They include Paul Krugman, a Nobel laureate and commentator in the New York Times, and many of President Barack Obama’s economic team. 

为了避免踏上日本的老路，发达国家必须通过两种方法来促进经济增长：对短期的需求进行支持，增加长期的供应。不幸的是，今天的政策制定者常常将这两个策略设为二选一的方案，而不是相互补充的方案。很多凯恩斯理论经济学家担心个体需求的缺少，因此认为关注经济的中期潜在趋势尚为时过早。这些人的代表有Paul Krugman，他是一位诺贝尔经济学奖获得者，并担任《纽约时报》的评论员，此外还有奥巴马总统的经济学家顾问团队的许多成员。
Stimulus v austerity 
经济刺激与紧缩

European economists put more emphasis on boosting medium-term growth, favouring reforms such as making labour markets more flexible. They tend to reject further fiscal stimulus to prop up demand. Jean-Claude Trichet, the president of the European Central Bank, is a strong advocate of structural reforms in Europe. But he is also one of the most ardent champions of the idea that cutting budget deficits will itself boost growth. All this has led to a passionate but narrow debate about fiscal stimulus versus austerity. 

欧洲的经济学家将更多注意力放在促进经济的长期增长上，因此对使劳动力市场更灵活这样的改革措施持赞成态度。他们倾向于拒绝通过进一步的财政刺激计划来提升需求。欧洲央行主席Jean-Claude Trichet是欧洲经济结构性改革的强有力支持者。但他同时也是缩减预算赤字将会促进经济增长这一观点的热烈拥护者。所有这些都引发了关于经济刺激与紧缩直接的激烈的争论。

This special report will argue that both sides are blinkered. Governments should think more coherently about how to support demand and boost supply at the same time. The exact priorities will differ from country to country, but there are several common themes. First, the Keynesians are right to observe that, for the rich world as a whole, there is a danger of overdoing the short-term budget austerity. Excessive budget-cutting poses a risk to the recovery, not least because it cannot easily be offset by looser monetary policy. Improvements to the structure of taxation and spending matter as much as the short-term deficits.

本文认为这两个观点都是片面狭隘的。政府应当在如何同时支持需求和促进供应方面思考地更为清楚。具体的优先级每个国家可能是不同的，但还是存在一些共同点。首先，凯恩斯主义者认为由于发达世界是一个联系紧密的个体，过度地进行短期的预算紧缩将会是一个危险的行为。过度的削减预算由于它无法通过宽松的货币政策来进行弥补，因此对于经济的复苏会造成危机，。征税与消费的结构性改进与短期的赤字是一样重要的。

Second, there is an equally big risk of ignoring threats to economies’ potential growth and of missing the opportunity for growth-enhancing microeconomic reforms. Most rich-country governments have learned one important lesson from previous financial crises: they have cleaned up their banking sectors reasonably quickly. But more competition and deregulation deserve higher billing, especially in services, which in all rich countries are likely to be the source of most future employment and productivity growth. 

其次，忽略对经济的潜在增长所构成的威胁与错失促进增长的微观层面改革的机遇，这两种情形都将是一个大麻烦。大多数发达国家政府已经从过去的金融危机中学习到了很重要的一点：它们必须对银行部门进行迅速有效地进行清理。但是更多的竞争和放松管制需要更高的财政支出，尤其在公共服务领域，这对于所有的发达国家来说将是未来就业和生产率增长的源泉。

Instead, too many governments are determined to boost innovation by reinventing industrial policy. Making the jobless more employable should be higher on the list, especially in America, where record levels of long-term unemployment suggest that labour markets may not be as flexible as many people believe.

      相反的是，有太多政府决定采取彻底改造工业发展策略来促进革新速度。在政府的工作清单上，让失业者能迅速就业这一项应该位列前列。尤其在美国，长期的失业率已经创下了新记录，这表明劳动力市场可能并不如许多人相信那样充满弹性。 

Faster growth is not a silver bullet. It will not eliminate the need to trim back unrealistic promises to pensioners; no rich country can simply grow its way out of looming pension and health-care commitments. Nor will it stop the relentless shift of economic gravity to the emerging world. Since developing economies are more populous than rich ones, they will inevitably come to dominate the world economy. But whether that shift takes place against a background of prosperity or stagnation depends on the pace of growth in the rich countries. For the moment, worryingly, too many of them seem to be headed for stagnation.

更快速的增长并不是“银弹”。它并不能消除政府对削减对领退休金者的不现实的承诺的需求。没有任何一个发达国家能简单忽视掉逐渐逼近的兑现退休金和医疗方面的承诺，而只考虑经济的发展。不仅如此，它也无法阻止经济重心向发展中国家倾斜的无情事实。既然发展中国家的人口基数要远大于发达国家，那么它们必然将主宰世界经济。但是这种转移时在经济繁荣还是经济停滞的背景下发生就取决于发达国家的经济增长速度。就目前令人担忧的经济状况来看，有太多的发达国家看上去正走向经济停滞。